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Abstract 
I have read the above paper with keen interest. The key finding of this paper is interesting: the 
appointment of independent directors has no perceptible influence on a firm’s economic performance in 
Bangladesh. The conclusion was derived from a sample of 274 firm-years. The implication of this finding 
is also very significant for regulators in Bangladesh and elsewhere ‘in their quest for harmonization of 
international corporate governance practices’ Rashid et al. (2010, p76). This paper also complements the 
results of an earlier paper on an allied topic by Bhuiyan and Biswas (2007) where they found that (p22) 
‘corporate governance disclosure in Bangladesh is significantly influenced by local ownership, the SEC 
notification, and size of the company but belonging to financial or non-financial institution company, 
multinational company, age and size of the board of directors do not have significant impact on corporate 
governance disclosure. So steps should be taken for mandatory compliance of the SEC notification and 
for reducing the gap between large and small firms’ disclosure practices’. 
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1. Introduction 
 
I have read the above paper with keen interest. The key finding of this paper is interesting: 
the appointment of independent directors has no perceptible influence on a firm’s economic 
performance in Bangladesh. The conclusion was derived from a sample of 274 firm-years1. 
The implication of this finding is also very significant for regulators in Bangladesh and 
elsewhere ‘in their quest for harmonization of international corporate governance practices’ 
Rashid et al. (2010, p76). This paper also complements the results of an earlier paper on an 
allied topic by Bhuiyan and Biswas (2007) where they found that (p22) ‘corporate 
governance disclosure in Bangladesh is significantly influenced by local ownership, the SEC 
notification, and size of the company but belonging to financial or non-financial institution 
company, multinational company, age and size of the board of directors do not have 
significant impact on corporate governance disclosure. So steps should be taken for 
mandatory compliance of the SEC notification and for reducing the gap between large and 
small firms’ disclosure practices’. 
The issue of corporate governance is interesting and has gained significance after the 
collapse of Enron and more recently with the failure of Lehman Brothers in the US triggering 
a world-wide crisis. I must commend the authors for their work in this difficult area of 
research where data limitation alone can stymie their efforts. The paper contains a very good 
literature review and could have been even more interesting if studies on South Asian 
countries were included. However, the result obtained in this paper would have been richer if 




The model is seemingly ad hoc and may be misspecified. The model is ad hoc because the 
explanators need firmer theoretical underpinnings. The model is misspecified because it omits 
some important relevant variables and will result in an omitted variable bias. For exposition I 
re-write the Rashid et al. (2010) model below: 
 
1 2 3 4
5 6 7        
it it it it
it it it
Y BDCOMP DIROWN LOGBDSIZE CEOD
DEBT LOGSIZE LOGAGE
α β β β β
β β β ε





• Yit is alternatively ROAit (Return on Assets) and Tobin’s Qit for ith firm at time t2 
• BDCOMPit is the board composition 
• DIROWNit is the percentage of shares owned by directors for ith firm at time t 
• LOGBDSIZEit is the board size for ith firm at time t 
• CEODit is the CEO duality for ith firm at time t 
 
                                                            
1 ‘A sample of 274 Bangladeshi firms is observed to determine the relationship among board composition, 
independent directors and firm performance’, in Rashid et al. (2010, p77) is misleading when compared with 
data given in Table 1 on p83. In fact, the sample size of the study is based on “An observation of 274 
Bangladeshi firm-years is used in the study” Rashid et al. (2010, p76). 
 
2 In the paper Yit does not appear on the LHS of the equation. 
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DEBTit is the debt ratio for ith firm at time t 
• LOGSIZEit is the firm size for ith firm at time t 
• LOGAGEit is the firm age for ith firm at time t 
• α is the intercept, iβ  is the regression coefficient of ith variable and itε is the 
composite error term 
• The subscript i represents the different firms and t represents the different years. 
 
The above model tries to explain the profitability of firms (via two alternative 
measures: Return on Assets (ROA) and Tobin’s Q) by the explanators stated above. The 
overwhelming majority of explanators captures only the managerial aspect of the firm and 
ignores the demand-supply and innovation and technological aspects of the firm which 
contribute to profit. The notable omissions are the firms’ retained profits (re-investable 
surplus) which augment capital and add to profitability in the future. Similarly, firms’ R&D 
expenditure can also be profit-enhancing in the future. From these illustrations, the model is 
misspecified. Further, it should not be estimated as a static model. A properly specified 
dynamic model must be developed to fully capture the factors contributing to profitability in 
a holistic sense. 
A misspecified model, such as the model in Rashid et al. (2010), with omitted relevant 
variables will overestimate the parameters of the model. As an illustration, suppose the true 
model is: 
 
1 2 2 3 3t tY X X t tuβ β β= + + +  
but we estimate the following model: 
1 2 2t tY X tvα α= + +  
It can be shown that, 2 2 32 3( )E bα β β
∧
= +  
where is the slope coefficient of regression of 32b 3X on the included variable 2X . The bias 
due to omission of other variables can be shown in an analogous way. It can also be shown 
that 2 )Va (r α
∧
will be biased as well. See Kmenta (1985, pp443-446) for a fuller discussion. 
Some of the included variables in the model such as LOGAGE are questionable. The 
inclusion of this variable is justified by Rashid et al. (2010, p85) in the following way: ‘Firm 
performance can also be influenced by the age of the firms. Older firms are likely to achieve 
greater efficiency by reducing costs than younger firms (Ang et al. 2000). The variable of age 
(LOGAGE) is defined here as the natural logarithm of years the firm is on the DSE.’ Thus a 
monotonic relationship is implied between the age of the firm and the firm’s profitability. 
This is not always true and the reasons are embedded in the structure of the firm in 
Bangladesh. 
The ownership and control of firms are described by Rashid et al. (2010, p84): ‘Apart 
from a few controlling ownerships by foreign investors and government and financial 
institutions, the public limited companies in Bangladesh are in general mainly controlled by 
family members who are founding sponsors and/or directors, leading to a high degree of 
ownership control.’ The over-concentration of family ownership control is the surest sign of a 
non-monotonic relation between firm-age and profitability. For instance, the death of a family 
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patriarch and/or a falling-out among feuding family members often leads to disintegration 
within the firm management and adversely affects the profitability and viability of the firm. 
There are numerous examples of this in Bangladesh (e.g. Quasem Group of Companies, Ilias 
Brothers). Nevertheless, even an amicable division of the business among family members 
can potentially impair the future performance and profitability of the firm. A recent split in 
Partex Group3 (one of the family-owned business houses of Bangladesh), hit the headline of 
the leading Bangladesh English newspaper Daily Star on 6 July 2010 which reports: ‘The 
break-up process started before 1/11 (11 January 2007). I have done it for my necessity’, 
founder of the company M A Hashem said. ‘It is better to divide the business among the five 
sons before my death.’ The Daily Star hints that this ‘split’ will weaken the Partex Group. 
Secondly, it may be argued that older firms suffer from inertia and a failure to 
innovate and thus they degenerate into oblivion. This is the Schumpeterian innovation 
process (new ideas + human capital + non-human capital). If new ideas do not emerge from 
older firms, then the ‘perennial gale of creative destruction’ sets in and newer firms with 
newer ideas enter the market and engage in rent-seeking activities thus ‘killing’ the older 
firms. Thus, it may be misleading to relate profitability with the age of the firm. 
 
3. The Composite Error Term itε  
 
The estimable model includes variables that vary across TIME and CROSS-SECTION. The 
model adopted in the paper assumes cross-sectional homogeneity and independence. How 
can this be possible for firms of different sizes in different industry groups in the sample? For 
example, corporate culture, the CEO’s style and the rules of the company’s bylaws give rise 
to a firm-specific, industry-specific effect that is constant over time but which is different 
between firms. Likewise, cross-sectional dependence is a real possibility where one firm’s 
behaviour and actions dictate the behaviour and actions of other allied firms. The authors are 
aware of the firm-specific heterogeneity when they write (p87): ‘Also, the data were collected 
from entities ignoring the underlying differences of their operations, as any two organisations 
are not the same.’ 
Rashid et al. (2010) could have modelled this behaviour in the composite error 
term itε . This may be the Achilles heel of this paper from which the conclusion is drawn. The 
authors fail to mention the assumptions of this error component of the model. This composite 
error term is vital and explicit assumptions must be invoked by the authors. Otherwise it can 
be a Pandora’s box, as the following discussion shows. 
If the individual firm-specific effect is taken into account, then the individual error 
component for the ith firm in a sample can be denoted by iν . Therefore, the total disturbance 
in the ith observation is ( ).i itν ε+  
Two different scenarios can emerge and these can have implications for estimating the 
parameters of the model. In case 1, if the explanators are contemporaneously uncorrelated 
with the disturbances, ν  and ε , then Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) yields a consistent 
estimate of the parameters. The disturbances are generally homoscedastic (with a variance 
equal to 2 2ν εσ σ+ ) but the disturbances are correlated with one another since all of the 
                                                            
3 With a modest start in 1959, Partex began with tobacco trading and prudent entrepreneurship under the 
leadership of Hashem. It now owns over 25 units – from tobacco to food, water, soft drinks, steel containers, 
edible oil, furniture, yarn and the IT sector. The group employs over 10,000 people. (Daily Star, 6 July 2010) 
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observations on a given individual firm share an identical value of ν . Since some 
disturbances are correlated, OLS is not the efficient estimator in this case. Instead we need to 
use the Feasible Generalised Least Squares (FGLS) for estimation. 
In case 2, it can so happen that the individual firm error components may be 
correlated with the explanatory variables. Since the explanatory variables are 
contemporaneously correlated with the disturbances, neither OLS nor FGLS is a consistent 
estimator of the parameters. Instead we need to resort to the fixed-effect estimator to derive 
efficient estimates of the parameters. Thus the choice of the fixed-effect or the random-effect 
estimation method depends on the researcher. Rashid et al. (2010) simply used OLS and thus 
the derived estimates are not efficient. 
 
4. The Sample Period 
 
This study has used unbalanced panel data with nearly 94% of the observations bunched in 
three years (2006, 2007 and 2008) and the remaining 6% of data are strewn across two years 
(2005 and 2009). The sampled years 2007 and 2008 are ‘abnormal years’ for the Bangladesh 
economy and politics. A quasi martial-law prevailed under the army-backed caretaker interim 
government. Civil rights under the Bangladesh Constitution were suspended from 1 
November 2007 until the general elections were held in December 2008 and there was a 
return to civilian government in January 2009. During this period the army-backed caretaker 
government incarcerated many eminent politicians (including former prime ministers) and 
businessmen to purge the country for holding a free and fair election. Many leading 
businessmen went into self-exile in neighbouring countries to avoid being arrested. This 
purge instilled fear among businesses. As a result business confidence was low and many 
businessmen ‘sat on their hands’ until the term of the caretaker government was over. Thus, 
during the period 2007 and 2008, business activity was in the doldrums. GDP growth slowed 
down largely because of the apathy and indifference of Bangladeshi businessmen and this 
was exacerbated by the onset of the Global Financial Crisis. To make matters worse, 
Bangladesh was battered by a severe flood followed by a devastating cyclone. The Ministry 
of Finance (2009, p1) described the economic conditions in 2007 and 2008: ‘The economy of 
Bangladesh continue to demonstrate considerable resilience during FY2008-09 despite the 
twin shocks arising from global recessions and the adverse effects of the consecutive floods 
and the cyclone-Sidar of the last fiscal year (FY2007-08). The economy is estimated to have 
grown at a rate of 5.9 percent, slightly below the growth rate (6.2 percent) of FY2007-08. The 
key feature of the economic performance during FY2008-09 is the strong recovery in 
agriculture sector coupled with moderate growth in industry and service sector.’ 
Thus, the sample period (2005-2009) is very short4 (effectively 3 years since 94% of 
observations are drawn within this period), and it is also not representative for assessing the 
profitability of firms in Bangladesh. 
                                                            
4 Corporate Governance Notification (2006) (CGN) for the appointment of ‘independent directors’ (Condition 
1.2, p1) was issued on 20 February 2006 and its effects will only be known after a time lag. Further, Condition 
1.2 is NOT a statutory requirement and no penalty is envisaged in the CGN for non-compliance. Refer to 
Bhuiyan and Biswas (2007) for the recommendation of mandatory compliance by firms in Bangladesh. 
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5. Results 
 
Table 5 contains the crucial results of this study. It would be useful if the authors included the 
statistical or theoretical justification for measuring some of the variables in natural logarithm 
and some of the variables in levels. It would also be useful to the readers if a fuller discussion 
was provided on the derived results. The authors simply concentrated on examining the 
statistical significance of the coefficient of BDCOMP ( 1β ) for deriving their conclusion. The 
magnitude of the estimated coefficient is substantial (0.144 and 0.418 respectively in the two 
models). The sign of 1β  is POSITIVE indicating the independent directors’ positive 
contribution to profitability; however, this substantial positive contribution of independent 
directors is rejected by the authors on the grounds of its statistical significance. Researchers 
need to decide on the dilemma: statistical significance versus economic importance. I would 
opt for the latter a la Miller and Rodgers (2008, p146): ‘A challenge in formulating 
appropriate guidelines is arriving at options that suit the presentation of different types of 
economic analyses, ranging from descriptive studies to hypothesis testing to program 
evaluations and policy proposals. It is our aim that these guidelines help researchers convey 
quantitative results more clearly, set standards that facilitate accumulation of new knowledge, 
generate findings that are relevant for policy reform, and address feminist critiques to put 
more emphasis on the substantive issues behind statistical analyses.’ 
It would be useful to discuss the vital information of the estimated model such as R2, 
F-statistic etc. and provide a thorough discussion on the estimated coefficients. The 
diagnostic tests of the estimated model (namely tests for heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation conveying information about the assumed ‘well-behavedness’ of the error 
term), have been omitted in the paper. From my experience I suspect heteroscedasticity in the 
estimated model because of the cross-sectional nature of data. The robustness of the single-
equation result could have been assessed if the authors reported the following in a separate 
table: the Hausman test or Ramsey’s RESET test to justify the selected model; the Jarque-
Bera test for assessing the normality of residuals; the CUSUM and CUSUM-Squared tests for 
testing parameter stability, etc. These vital statistics would have been very useful in assessing 




Here I quote the authors (Rashid et al. 2010, p87): ‘The relationship between outside 
directors and firms’ performance is not clear explicitly in case of developed economies 
(Judge et al. 2003). This study also supports this argument, finding that outside independent 
directors are good monitors but cannot add economic value to firms in Bangladesh.’ I am not 
sure how the authors can claim that external independent directors are ‘good monitors’, as 
this has not been tested in this paper? Without a rigorous proof such an ambit claim is 
untenable. Lastly, on the basis of weaknesses of the data stated above and the simplifying 
assumptions about the firms’ behaviour, the conclusions of the paper are feeble. 
Overall, this paper is a good start in an important area of research. I hope that the 
authors can overcome some of the gaps acknowledged in their conclusion (p87). I suggest 
that the authors develop a properly specified econometric model (preferably a dynamic 
model) which is estimated with a robust estimation procedure (such as a fixed effect model) 
and with a longer data set. 
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